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the district during that time.
Boeing argued that the City failed to show that the reason the
District decided to obtain water from other sources after the drought
was not due to the restrictions imposed during the drought. Boeing
contended that the District decided to seek alternative sources before
the drought: (1) due to concerns that the pipeline from the City could
not handle increased capacity due to population growth; and (2)
because the District wanted a source to the west of the Willamette
River that had better quality water. The City responded by arguing
that although the District may have had many reasons for obtaining
alternate sources, the inability to use the wells, coupled with the
elimination of minimum purchase requirements due to the drought,
played a significant part in the District's decision to use other sources
after the drought.
Boeing presented testimony from the District's directors that the
contamination was not a factor in the District's decision to obtain
water from sources other than the City after the drought had ended.
One director stated that the main motivation was to develop a source
independent from the City. Another director stated that the primary
reason for finding other sources of water was the need to get water to
Washington County. The City countered with testimony that the
District did not invest any money in other expansion projects until
after the drought in 1992, and that the final agreement between the
District and new suppliers was not approved until 1994.
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant
must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Once the
movant has met its burden, the onus is on the opposing party to
establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. In this case, the
court found the City's evidence very thin on the issue of whether the
contamination together with the drought caused the District to buy a
majority of its water from sources other than the City. However, the
court was required to look at the evidence in a light most favorable to
the City, and in doing so, the court found the City had met its burden.
As a result, Boeing's motion for summary judgment was denied.
DavidM.Jacob
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 279 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that while equity was inappropriate in the
abandonment context, equity may be appropriate in the forfeiture
context, if the landowners can show on a case-by-case basis that they
were prevented from complying with transfer requirements).
In the mid-1980s, a number of landowners in the Newlands
Reclamation Project in Nevada submitted applications to transfer
water rights between different parcels of property. The Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") protested the applications under the
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Nevada law of forfeiture and abandonment, arguing that the transfers
would decrease the water flow into Pyramid Lake, situated on the
Tribe's homeland. The federal government and the Tribe appealed
from an order of the Nevada district court, which affirmed a
determination of the Nevada State Engineer ("Engineer") granting the
landowners' applications to transfer water rights.
First, the Tribe argued that the district court erred in affirming the
Engineer's determination that a prolonged period of non-use of water
rights does not create a rebuttable presumption that a landowner
intended to abandon those rights. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument in a past case, United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. In that case,
this court held that although a prolonged period of non-use may raise
an inference of intent to abandon, it does not create a rebuttable
presumption. Thus, the court affirmed the evidentiary standard that
the district court applied in making its parcel-specific rulings on
abandonment.
Second, the Engineer asked the court to reconsider their 1993
ruling in United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. ("Alpine M") to the
extent it held that 1902 was not the relevant priority date for
determining the application of the Nevada forfeiture statute. Yet, Orr
Water Ditch affirmed Alpine 1M, holding that landowners cannot claim
1902 as the date their water rights were initiated. Thus, the court
rejected the request to reconsider Alpine III and upheld the district
court to the extent it affirmed the Engineer's parcel-specific
application of the state forfeiture statute.
Therefore, the only issue outstanding on appeal was whether the
district court's broad application of an intrafarm exemption
constituted reversible error. The Tribe contended that the district
court erred in exempting intrafarm transfers of water rights from the
operation of Nevada's forfeiture and abandonment laws based on
equitable considerations. Further, the Tribe contended that the
district court erred in granting equitable relief to intrafarm transfers
based upon the assumption that the government and the TruckeeCarson Irrigation District ("TCID") had either explicitly or tacitly
approved these transfers prior to the landowner's submission of formal
transfer applications.
However, in the 1989 case United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir
Co. ("Alpine IF), this court rejected these arguments. If the transfer
applicants moved water within their farm without complying with state
transfer requirements, they did so "at their own risk" under Alpine II,
since the Reclamation Act made it clear that state law applied to these
actions. The United States never had the authority under the
Reclamation Act to approve such transfers; the fact that they occurred
had no bearing on whether state law principles of forfeiture and
abandonment should not be applied.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tribe that, with respect to
abandonment, rather than supporting equitable relief, the factors
noted by the district court more appropriately bear on whether the
landowners formed the requisite intent to abandon their rights. The
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district court's factors include: evidence in the record that the
procedures to transfer water changed at least three times over the
years; an applicant was told that transfers were not allowed; and no
evidence existed that any of the landowners making intrafarm transfers
used more water than the amount granted by contract with the
government.
The court noted that if the landowners attempted to transfer rights
prior to filing their applications in this case and were thwarted by the
government or TCID, which would most likely demonstrate their lack
of intent to abandon. Yet, 'the court stated that the fact that a
landowner might have been prevented from filing a transfer
application would do nothing to alter a finding of non-use for the
statutory period. To completely remove the possibility of equitable
relief for those landowners who would otherwise technically forfeit
their properties through non-use, but who made efforts to comply with
the transfer requirements during the moratorium period, would be
inconsistent with equitable principles. The law abhors forfeiture; thus
equity should operate in these limited situations to protect
landowners.
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order
to the extent that it provided blanket equitable relief for intrafarm
transfers without requiring an individualized factual showing with
respect to each transfer applicant. More specifically, the court held
that the district court erred in granting equitable relief to those
landowners facing abandonment because the landowners may
demonstrate that they did not abandon their water rights as a matter
of law. On remand, the district court was instructed to make factual
findings in order to determine whether each individual landowner had
the requisite intent to abandon in light of the factors noted in the
district court's opinion. With respect to forfeiture, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's application of a blanket equitable
However, the court concluded that equity may be
exemption.
appropriate on a case-by-case basis in the forfeiture context if a
landowner can show steps were taken to transfer water rights during
the period of non-use, but that those steps were thwarted by the
government or TCID.
Nicole A. Ressue
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 269
F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the Hayden-O'Mahoney
Amendment did not repeal Section 4-1 of the Reclamation Act of 1902
in its entirety and thus did not terminate the water districts' rights to
certain revenues arising under Section 4-1; further holding Section 4-1
and the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 did not impose upon the
Secretary of the Interior an obligation to generate profits for the water

